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THE SANCTITY OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
RELATIONSHIP – UNDERMINED BY THE FEDERAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
 APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. Borukhova1 
(decided October 25, 2011) 
 
The right to be free from self-incrimination is a fundamental 
constitutional protection afforded to all criminal defendants.2  This 
protection is found in the United States Constitution‘s Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due 
process clauses, the Fifth Amendment‘s express self-incrimination 
provision, and has further been expanded by the procedural safe-
guards famously provided by Miranda v. Arizona.3  While the consti-
tutional protections found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
and their subsequent expansion by Miranda have been adopted in 
New York as consistent with the State Constitution,4 New York‘s in-
terpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel goes well 
 
1 931 N.Y.S.2d 349 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2011). 
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966). 
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  The Fifth Amendment due process and privilege against self-
incrimination provisions state that ―[n]o person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law[.]‖  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel provision 
provides that ―[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial . . . and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.‖  U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI.  Both the Fifth and Sixth Amendment provisions originally applied only to the Federal 
Government, but later were deemed fundamental rights, essential to ensure a fair trial, and 
―thus [were] made obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.‖  Pointer v. Tex-
as, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).  The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause provides that 
―[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law[.]‖  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
4 People v. Paulman, 833 N.E.2d 239, 244 (N.Y. 2005). 
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beyond that of the federal courts.5  Federal courts narrowly construe 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to attach only after the com-
mencement of a formal prosecution, while New York boastfully ex-
pands the application, and maintains that the right may attach well 
before the commencement of judicial proceedings.6  New York re-
cognizes that pre-indictment and pre-arraignment questioning can be 
just as detrimental to a criminal defendant as questioning after the in-
itiation of a formal proceeding.7  Accordingly, through reasoning re-
miniscent of the Miranda principles, New York extends an indelible 
right to counsel to all criminal defendants even prior to the com-
mencement of judicial proceedings.8 
The recent decision of the New York Appellate Division in 
People v. Borukhova9 predominately focused on two issues involving 
the admissibility of self-incriminating statements made by a suspect 
to police officers, prior to the initiation of a formal criminal proceed-
ing.10  The first asked whether the defendant‘s statements made to the 
police were the products of custodial interrogations, conducted with-
out the proper administration of Miranda warnings.11  The second 
asked whether the statements obtained by the police after an attorney 
called the precinct on the defendant‘s behalf and requested that she 
not be questioned were obtained in violation of her right to counsel.12 
In Borukhova, the Appellate Division held that the defendant 
was not subjected to custodial interrogation, and as such the police 
officer‘s obligation to Mirandize the defendant was never triggered.13  
On the other hand, the Appellate Division found that when the defen-
dant‘s attorney contacted the precinct, under New York law, her in-
delible right to counsel attached and could not be waived absent the 
presence of counsel.14  Therefore, the defendant‘s statements made to 
the police subsequent to her attorney‘s involvement were obtained in 
 
5 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 364. 
6 Matter of Robert O., 439 N.Y.S.2d 994, 1003 (Fam. Ct. 1981). 
7 People v. Donovan, 193 N.E.2d 628, 630 (N.Y. 2003). 
8 Robert O., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. 
9 931 N.Y.S.2d 349 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 2011). 
10 Id. at 362. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 363. 
14 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 365. 
2
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violation of her right to counsel.15 
This case note takes the position that the federal interpretation 
of when and how the right to counsel attaches, both undermines the 
sanctity of the attorney-client relationship and leaves a criminal de-
fendant unprotected against self-incrimination at vital stages of a 
criminal prosecution.  Unlike the federal interpretation, this case note 
advocates for New York‘s expansive approach to the right to counsel, 
as it properly protects a criminal defendant during all pre-trial stages, 
including pre-arraignment, at which time an accused‘s fate may be 
sealed. 
This case note will review the federal application of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment due processes clauses, the Fifth 
Amendment‘s express privilege against self-incrimination, and Mi-
randa protections, as fundamental and procedural safeguards against 
self-incrimination.  In addition, this case note will review the differ-
ent applications of the federal Sixth Amendment right to counsel and 
its expansion under New York State law.  Section I of this case note 
discusses the facts and decision of the recent New York Appellate 
Division case of People v. Borukhova.  Section II discusses the feder-
al protections against self-incrimination afforded to all criminal de-
fendants by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution 
and their expansion under Miranda.  Section III addresses the federal 
requirements for a valid waiver of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment protections and Miranda.  Section IV discusses the federal ap-
plication of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and Section V ad-
dresses the federal requirements for a valid waiver of this right.  
Section VI discusses New York‘s adoption and expansion of the fed-
eral protections against self-incrimination, largely with respect to 
when and how the right to counsel attaches, as well as the implica-
tions that arise from the attachment of this right.  Section VII dis-
cusses the Borukhova decision through the scope of both the federal 
court‘s narrow interpretation of the right to counsel and the New 
York court‘s expansive interpretation, and further, the relationship 
between these two interpretations and the attorney-client privilege.  
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF PEOPLE V. 
BORUKHOVA 
On Sunday, October 28, 2007, the victim, Daniel Malakov, 
was shot to death outside a park in Queens, New York.16  On the 
morning of his death, the victim brought his four-year-old daughter to 
the park to meet the defendant, Mazoltuv Borukhova, with whom he 
was involved in a bitter divorce and custody battle.17  From the time 
that the divorce action commenced, the victim and the defendant 
were involved in extensive litigation with respect to custody and visi-
tation rights of their daughter.18  Initially, the defendant was granted 
temporary custody, until roughly three weeks prior to the shooting 
when, unexpectedly, temporary custody was awarded to the victim.19  
Three days after the unexpected custody transfer, the defendant and 
her sister made threats on the victim‘s life to both his father and his 
uncle.20 
On the morning of his death, while waiting for the defendant 
at the park, the victim was murdered ―by a man wielding a gun 
equipped with a makeshift silencer fashioned out of a bleach bottle 
and duct tape.‖21  The fingerprints found on the silencer were identi-
fied as those of the co-defendant, Mikhail Mallayev.22  In addition, 
several eyewitnesses to the shooting gave similar descriptions of both 
the incident and the shooter.23  After hearing ―shots fired[,]‖ the first 
officer responded to the scene where he briefly spoke to an eyewit-
ness, and then at the defendant‘s request, helped administer CPR to 
the victim.24 
 
16 Id. at 353. 
17 Id.  The victim commenced the divorce action in 2005 ―which proved to be so acrimo-
nious that his father was later to describe it as ‗a completely unfriendly and uncivilized di-
vorce.‘ ‖  Id. at 354. 
18 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 354.  The custody battle over the daughter was so exten-
sive that an attorney had to be appointed on the child‘s behalf.  Id. 
19 Id. at 353. 
20 Id. at 355.  In one of the threats made to the victim‘s father by the defendant‘s sister, 
she specifically stated ―[you] are going to lose your son on . . . Sunday.‖  Id.  The following 
Sunday morning, the victim was killed.  Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 355. 
21 Id. at 353.  Earlier that morning, the victim expressed to his father his intent to give his 
daughter to her mother that day.  Id. at 355. 
22 Id. at 353. 
23 Id. at 355-57. 
24 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 357.  The defendant, who was present at the scene, identi-
4
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The defendant, accompanied by an officer, was then trans-
ported to the hospital ―to make sure she was okay.‖25  It was not until 
approximately one hour later that a detective arrived to question the 
defendant about the shooting.26  The detective asked the defendant a 
variety of allegedly investigative questions, over the course of fifteen 
to twenty minutes, during which time the defendant was not re-
strained, and appeared calm.27  The interview ended when the defen-
dant stated ―[s]he wanted to think about the events and she will talk 
to the police at a later time when she feels a little bit better.‖28  Then, 
after the defendant was released from the hospital, she voluntarily ac-
companied the detective to the precinct to continue to speak with the 
police.29 
Prior to arriving at the police precinct, the defendant‘s sister, 
on the defendant‘s behalf, contacted an attorney who agreed to 
represent her.30  At 1:17 P.M. the defendant‘s attorney ―called the 
112th Precinct and told the person who answered the phone that he 
was the defendant‘s counsel, that he wanted to speak to her, and that 
he did not want her to be questioned until he had an opportunity to 
speak to her.‖31  Before questioning began, a sergeant at the precinct 
provided the defendant with the attorney‘s information and asked if 
she either knew him or retained him.32  In reply to the sergeant‘s 
questions, ―[t]he defendant responded that she had not called an at-
torney, and didn‘t know the attorney who had called.‖33 
Over the course of the next three hours, beginning at 1:45 
P.M., the defendant was subjected to three separate interviews, dur-
ing which the defendant was neither physically restrained, nor under 
constant supervision.34  The detectives concluded their questioning 
upon the arrival of the defendant‘s attorney at the precinct, and upon 
 
fied herself to the officer as a doctor.  Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 357-58. 





33 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 358. 
34 Id. 
5
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his request that the police refrain from questioning the defendant any 
further.35  Interestingly, the defendant‘s counsel waited at the precinct 
for more than an hour before he was able to speak to his client.36 
During the course of the investigation of the shooting, the po-
lice uncovered copious amounts of evidence linking the defendant 
and co-defendant.37  As such, on February 7, 2008, both the defen-
dant and co-defendant were indicted on charges of murder and con-
spiracy.38 
At the pre-trial Huntley hearing,39 the defendant moved to 
suppress the statements made to the police both at the hospital and at 
the precinct.40  The defendant argued that both statements were the 
products of custodial interrogations, and were obtained in violation of 
her Miranda rights because she was not given the requisite warn-
ings.41  The defendant also argued that the statements she made at the 
precinct were obtained in violation of her right to counsel.42  In re-
sponse to the defendant‘s first argument, the court found the defen-
dant ―was not in custody when interviewed by the police because a 
reasonable person innocent of any crime, would have believed she 
was being interviewed as a witness to the shooting.‖43  In response to 
the defendant‘s second argument, the court found that ―the defen-
dant‘s right to counsel did not attach when [the attorney] called the 
precinct because the defendant unequivocally stated that she did not 
know who he was, and that he was not her lawyer.‖44  As such, the 
defendant‘s applications were denied, and the court allowed for the 
statements obtained, both at the hospital and the precinct, to be intro-
 
35 Id. at 359. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  Some of the evidence linking the defendant and the co-defendant included: a fa-
milial relationship by marriage, an exponential increase in the number of phone calls ex-
changed between the two in the months leading up to the shooting, and large cash deposits 
made at several Queens bank branches into the co-defendant‘s accounts.  Borukhova, 931 
N.Y.S.2d at 359. 
38 Id. at 360. 
39 People v. Huntley, 204 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1965).  Prior to submission to the jury, the 
Judge must independently, through express findings, make a determination about the volun-
tariness of a confession.  Id. at 183. 
40 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 360. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 360-61. 
44 Id. at 361. 
6
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duced at trial.45 
The joint trial of the defendant and co-defendant began on 
January 26, 2009 and lasted roughly six weeks.46  On March 10, 
2009, after one day of deliberations, the jury found both the defen-
dant and co-defendant guilty of first degree murder, and second de-
gree conspiracy, and the defendant was sentenced to life in prison 
without parole.47 
The defendant appealed the conviction and challenged the 
suppression ruling on the same grounds—namely that the defendant‘s 
statements were obtained during custodial interrogations, without Mi-
randa warnings, and the statements made at the precinct were ob-
tained in violation of the defendant‘s right to counsel.48  On the first 
issue, the Appellate Division ruled, consistent with the Huntley hear-
ing, that the defendant was not ―in custody‖ when her statements 
were made both at the hospital and at the precinct.49  Therefore, the 
court held that ―the duty to administer Miranda warnings was not 
triggered.‖50  The court explained that the defendant was accompa-
nied to the hospital by an officer for her own wellbeing, and that the 
later questioning at the hospital, conducted by the detective, was brief 
and investigative in nature rather than accusatory.51  The defendant 
then voluntarily went to the precinct where questioning continued in-
termittently over several hours, again for alleged investigatory pur-
poses, and during which time the defendant was frequently left unsu-
pervised and unrestrained.52 
With respect to the second issue, regarding whether the de-
fendant‘s statements obtained at the precinct were in violation of her 
right to counsel, the Appellate Division reversed the trial court‘s rul-
ing and found in favor of the defendant.53  The Appellate Division 
found the defendant‘s right to counsel, regardless of the fact that the 
defendant‘s sister retained the attorney, attached when the attorney 
 
45 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 360-61. 
46 Id. at 361. 
47 Id. at 362. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 363. 





Laterza: Freedom from Self-Incrimination
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
  
1100 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
 
―called the 112th Precinct, identified himself as the defendant‘s attor-
ney, asked to speak to her, and requested that she not be questioned 
until he had an opportunity to speak to her.‖54  In light of this ruling, 
the court reasonably concluded that the defendant could not have 
properly waived her right to counsel absent the presence of her attor-
ney, and therefore, the trial court should have suppressed the state-
ments obtained at the Precinct.55  Despite the Appellate Division‘s 
ruling that the defendant‘s statements made at the precinct should 
have been suppressed, the improper admission was found to be a 
harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence against her, and 
the conviction was upheld.56 
 
II. THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION AND MIRANDA’S PROCEDURAL 
SAFEGUARDS 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution bear fundamental safeguards to protect individuals 
against self-incrimination.57  The Fourteenth Amendment declares 
that a state shall not ―deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
 
54 Id. at 365. 
55 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 365. 
56 Id. at 368-69.  The defendant appealed her conviction on several other grounds outside 
the scope of this analysis.  First, the defendant appealed the actions of the trial court in ―ad-
mitting into evidence a series of ‗extraordinarily prejudicial‘ hearsay statements‖ one of 
which included the victim‘s father‘s testimony regarding the threatening statements made by 
the defendant‘s sister, on the victim‘s life.  Id. at 367.  Second, the defendant appealed the 
introduction of the testimony of the victim‘s father, in which he stated that his son expressed 
a plan to bring his daughter to the park to drop her off with the defendant on the morning of 
the shooting.  Id. at 369.  Third, the defendant appealed the use of Justice Strauss‘s decision 
from the child‘s temporary custody hearing.  Id. at 370.  Fourth, the defendant appealed on 
grounds that the trial court violated her right to testify and present a defense by sustaining 
objections that would allow her to explain some of her actions more fully.  Borukhova, 931 
N.Y.S.2d at 370.  Fifth, the defendant appealed based on the contention that she was ―de-
prived of a fair trial, and deprived of effective assistance of counsel, because her attorney 
was required to deliver his summation without adequate preparation time.‖  Id. at 371.  Fi-
nally, the defendant sought to raise several other issues on appeal, but her failure to raise 
timely objections did not preserve these issues for review.  Id. at 372-73. 
57 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972). 
8
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without due process of law . . . .‖58  Likewise, the Fifth Amendment 
also contains a due process clause, but it further affords an explicit 
privilege against self-incrimination.59  It provides that ―[n]o person    
. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .‖60 
Based exclusively on the ―Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
privilege against compulsory self incrimination, [and] upon the 
theory that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive‖61  Miranda 
added procedural safeguards to these constitutional liberties in 
1966.62  The Court in Miranda formulated the substance of the requi-
site warnings deserving of all suspects before being questioned in a 
custodial interrogation.63  The requirements of the warnings were 
stated as follows: 
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he 
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can 
be used against him in a court of law, that he has the 
right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he can-
not afford an attorney one will be appointed for him 
prior to any questioning if he so desires.64 
Even though the rights set out in Miranda are procedural 
measures that are ―not themselves rights protected by the Constitu-
tion[,]‖65 they create vital safeguards required to preserve the undis-
puted rights of an accused to remain silent and free from interroga-
tion absent the opportunity to consult with a lawyer.66  Thus, should 
an accused exercise her right to remain silent or to have an attorney 
present, in any manner and at any time prior to or during questioning, 
the police must respect this decision and ―the interrogation ‗must 
 
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
59 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
60 Id. 
61 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. 
62 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436. 
63 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010). 
64 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. 
65 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994). 
66 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981). 
9
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cease.‘ ‖67  Further, absent the proper administration of Miranda 
warnings, statements obtained in a custodial interrogation, ―whether 
exculpatory or inculpatory,‖ would violate the ―procedural safeguards 
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination[]‖ and 
therefore, may not be used in a criminal prosecution.68 
The obligation to Mirandize a suspect does not attach until 
she is rendered both in custody and subject to interrogation.69  Ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, an individual is in custody for the pur-
pose of Miranda, either when there has been a formal arrest or a ―re-
straint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a 
formal arrest.‖70  In Yarborough v. Alvarado,71 the Court set out a 
two-inquiry test for Miranda custody.72  First, ―[c]ourts must examine 
‗all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation‘ ‖ and second, 
―determine ‗how a reasonable person in the position of the individual 
being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her freedom of 
action.‘ ‖73  As such, the test for whether there is a restraint on the 
freedom of movement of an accused is an objective inquiry, and not 
based on the subjective views of either the interrogator or the indi-
vidual subject to questioning.74  While an officer‘s subjective view of 
the potential culpability of the accused is relevant, the officer‘s views 
are only a factor in assessing custody if they were both revealed to 
the accused and if the revelation of those views would have affected a 
reasonable person‘s perception of her ability to leave.75 
The Court in Miranda narrowly construed its procedural pro-
tections to apply to ―police interrogation practices that involve ex-
press questioning of a defendant while in custody.‖76  However, the 
 
67 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2268 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
473-74). 
68 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980).  Exculpatory statements are generally 
statements that tend to exonerate an accused, while inculpatory statements tend to implicate 
her.  Andrew R. Keller, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation 
Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159, 159 (1983). 
69 Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. 
70 Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). 
71 541 U.S. 652 (2004). 
72 Id. at 663. 
73 Id. (quoting Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322, 325). 
74 Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323. 
75 Id. at 324-25. 
76 Innis, 446 U.S. at 298. 
10
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Court in Rhode Island v. Innis,77 expanded this view to include cir-
cumstances that do not involve express questioning in order to protect 
against ―the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect in-
terrogation, rather than to implement the plain mandate of Miran-
da.‖78  The broader application of ―the term ‗interrogation‘ under Mi-
randa refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or 
action on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.‖79  While the in-
tent of the police during questioning is not irrelevant, the purpose of 
the Miranda safeguards are reflected in the fact that the determination 
of whether the questioning constituted an ―interrogation‖ focuses on 
the perceptions of the individual in custody.80 
The main purpose of Miranda was to ensure proper safe-
guards were placed on custodial interrogations to combat the ―inhe-
rently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individu-
al‘s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not 
otherwise do so freely.‖81  The atmosphere of custodial interrogations 
can quickly overbear the will of an accused who has been informed 
of her rights.82  As such, Miranda established the importance of the 
right, not only to consult with an attorney prior to questioning, but al-
so the right to the presence of an attorney during questioning, as ―in-
dispensible to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege[.]‖83 
 
77 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
78 Id. at 299 n.3. 
79 Id. at 301.  An ―incriminating response‖ constitutes ―any response-whether inculpatory 
or exculpatory-that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial.‖  Id. at 301 n.5 (emphasis 
omitted). 
80 Id. at 301.  The intent of the police may be relevant to show that the police officers 
should have known that their words or actions were ―reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response.‖  Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7.  For instance, where the police have knowledge 
of the defendant‘s unusual susceptibility ―to a particular form of persuasion‖ this might be a 
factor in determining whether or not the suspect was subject to an ―interrogation.‖  Id. at 301 
n.8. 
81 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
82 Id. at 369. 
83 Id. at 469.  The Court in Miranda further provided several important functions served 
by the presence of counsel during an interrogation, namely: to ―mitigate the dangers of un-
trustworthiness‖ should the accused decide to speak to the interrogators; reduce the likelih-
ood of coercive police practices and testify in court should the police actually exercise coer-
cive practices; and guarantee that any statements given by the accused are full and accurate, 
and further ensure they are properly reported if used at trial.  Id. at 470. 
11
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III. FEDERAL WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTIONS AND MIRANDA RIGHTS 
Miranda created a rigid rule–a detained suspect must be ad-
vised of her rights prior to a custodial interrogation, and that if a sus-
pect indicates that she would like to remain silent, or if she requests 
the presence of an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an at-
torney is provided.84  After a proper administration of the requisite 
warnings, a suspect may choose to waive her Miranda rights includ-
ing the right to counsel.85  The law is clear and the burden is high that 
where a suspect wishes to waive her rights under Miranda, the waiver 
must be both knowing and voluntary.86  As the Court stated in Ed-
wards v. Arizona,87 ―waivers of counsel must not only be voluntary 
but must also constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege[.]‖88  It should be noted 
―that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver,‖ 
and that this strong presumption against waiver applies equally both 
at trial and to pretrial proceedings.89 
A valid waiver of Miranda must be ― ‗voluntary in the sense 
that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than in-
timidation, coercion, or deception‘ and ‗made with a full awareness 
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences 
of the decision to abandon it.‘ ‖90  A determination of whether a sus-
pect‘s waiver was voluntary, as well as knowing and intelligent, is 
premised upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case, 
considering the suspect‘s background, experience, and conduct.91  
When a suspect has invoked her right to counsel that right is not 
deemed waived simply by showing that the suspect responded to po-
lice-initiated questioning.92  That is, once the right to counsel is in-
voked, police must refrain from routine questioning until legal coun-
 
84 Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1219 (2010). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
88 Id. at 482. 
89 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404. 
90 Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986)). 
91 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482. 
92 Id. at 484. 
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sel is made available or the accused voluntarily ―initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.‖93 
The Court in Edwards stated that ―an accused‘s request for an 
attorney is per se an invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights, re-
quiring that all interrogation cease[]‖ until an attorney has been pro-
vided.94  Corresponding to the rights recognized in Miranda, the 
Court in Edwards held that although the Constitution does not prohi-
bit further questioning, this right is inherent in constitutional juri-
sprudence and necessary to protect against badgering a suspect to 
waive her previously asserted Miranda rights.95  Thus, the proper ap-
plication of the Edwards rule requires the court to determine whether 
a suspect actually exercised her right to counsel.96  However, if a 
statement does not ―meet the requisite level of clarity‖ or a suspect 
appears indecisive about requesting counsel, officers may evade the 
traditional requirement to end the interrogation.97 
The case of Moran v. Burbine98 illustrates the issue of waiver 
of Fifth Amendment protections and Miranda.99  In Moran, the police 
properly administered Miranda warnings prior to questioning the de-
fendant, and obtained an express written waiver of those rights.100  
Even though an attorney was not requested by the defendant prior to 
questioning, unbeknownst to him, the defendant‘s sister had con-
tacted an attorney on his behalf.101  Upon retention, the attorney con-
tacted the police to notify them of her representation.102  However, 
the police never informed the defendant about his representation, and 
proceeded to elicit a confession.103  The Supreme Court found that 
despite the defendant‘s lack of knowledge of counsel, his waiver of 
rights was both knowing and voluntary, and therefore constituted a 
valid waiver.104  The Court admitted: 
 
93 Id. at 484-85. 
94 Id. at 485. 
95 Davis, 512 U.S. at 458. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 459. 
98 475 U.S. 412 (1986). 
99 Id. at 421. 
100 Id. at 420-21. 
101 Id. at 416-17. 
102 Id. 
103 Moran, 475 U.S. at 417, 421. 
104 Id. at 422. 
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[n]o doubt that the additional information would have 
been useful to [defendant]; perhaps even might have 
affected his decision to confess.  But we have never 
read the Constitution to require that police supply a 
suspect with a flow of information to help him cali-
brate his self-interest in deciding whether to speak or 
stand by his rights.105 
The Court further explained that the objective of Miranda warnings 
―is not to mold police conduct for its own sake[,]‖ but rather to pro-
tect against the inherently compulsory nature of custodial interroga-
tions and in effect, against violations of the accused‘s constitutional 
rights.106  The Court further stated ―a rule that focuses on how the po-
lice treat an attorney-conduct that has no relevance at all to the degree 
of compulsion experienced by the defendant during interrogation-
would ignore both Miranda’s mission and its only source of legitima-
cy.‖107  The Court in Moran expressly refused to expand Miranda 
protections and maintained that the police were not required to in-
form the accused when an attorney had made efforts to contact 
him.108  The Court in Moran further argued that allowing this expan-
sion of Miranda would upset the balance between the purpose of cus-
todial interrogations, as it would undermine the clarity of what is re-
quired by police conducting an interrogation, and the protective 
nature of Miranda warnings against the coercive nature of interroga-
tions.109 
 
IV. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL: 
PROTECTIONS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 
UNAVAILABLE UNTIL THE COMMENCEMENT OF FORMAL 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 
The right to counsel is expressly afforded by the Sixth 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 424-25. 
107 Id. at 425. 
108 Moran, 475 U.S. at 425.  This case will be revisited in the context of the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.  See infra notes 127, 129-31. 
109 Moran, 475 U.S. at 424. 
14
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Amendment of the Constitution, which states ―[i]n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense.‖110  Protections under the Sixth Amend-
ment‘s right to counsel are automatically triggered once judicial pro-
ceedings are initiated against a criminal defendant, but not a minute 
before.111  Judicial proceedings can be initiated against a defendant 
―by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, informa-
tion, or arraignment.‖112 
The constitutional right to counsel, once triggered, must be 
provided to the accused regardless of whether the request is made by 
the defendant, as this right is not predicated on the defendant‘s per-
sonal request.113  Further, once attached, ―the police may not interfere 
with the efforts of a defendant‘s attorney to act as a ‗ ―medium‖ be-
tween [the suspect] and the State‘ during the interrogation.‖114  
Therefore, the commencement of adversary proceedings forecloses 
the government‘s ability to interrogate a defendant without the pres-
ence of legal representation.115  Sixth Amendment protections, absent 
waiver, unquestionably attach after ―the first formal charging pro-
ceeding,‖ but not before, even where an attorney-client relationship is 
triggered.116  Regardless of whether counsel is retained by a suspect, 
or a member of the suspect‘s family, prior to interrogation, the exis-
tence of an attorney-client relationship does not itself trigger Sixth 
 
110 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
111 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). 
112 Id. 
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formal-
ism.  It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal 
justice.  For it is only then that the government has committed itself to 
prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and 
defendant have solidified.  It is then that a defendant finds himself faced 
with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the 
intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.  It is this point, 
therefore, that marks the commencement of the ‗criminal prosecutions‘ 
to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are ap-
plicable. 
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90. 
113 Carnely v. H.G. Cochran, Jr., 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962). 
114 Moran, 475 U.S. at 428 (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985)) (altera-
tion in original). 
115 Brewer, 430 U.S. at 401. 
116 Moran, 475 U.S. at 428-29. 
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Amendment protections.117 
The purpose of the Sixth Amendment is to provide the defen-
dant with assistance, by an individual who is well versed in the law, 
to ensure meaningful representation in the adversarial system.118  On 
the other hand, the intended function of the Sixth Amendment, ―is not 
to wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client relationship for 
its own sake any more than it is to protect a suspect from the conse-
quences of his own candor.‖119 
Escobedo v. State of Illinois,120 represents the one case that 
deviated from the Supreme Court‘s long running and continued deci-
sional trend that Sixth Amendment protections are not triggered by a 
suspect‘s retention of counsel.121  In Escobedo, an interrogation of the 
defendant was conducted prior to a formal indictment, during which 
the defendant was not adequately warned of his ―absolute constitu-
tional right to remain silent,‖ and was denied requests to speak with 
his attorney.122  Without fully understanding the consequences of his 
self-incrimination, the defendant was urged by police to make state-
ments, and did, out of fear that his silence would equate to guilt.123 
The Court found that despite the fact that the interrogation 
was conducted before a formal indictment, the investigation was no 
longer ―a general investigation of ‗an unsolved crime[,]‘ [p]etitioner 
had become the accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to 
‗get him‘ to confess his guilt despite his constitutional right not to do 
so.‖124  As such, the Court held that the defendant should have had 
 
117 Id. at 430.  In Moran, the Court held the suspect‘s Sixth Amendment protections were 
not triggered by an attorney-client privilege, where the suspect‘s sister contacted an attorney 
on his behalf, and the attorney contacted the precinct regarding his representation, because it 
was prior to commencement of the case.  Id. at 416, 432. 
118 Id. at 430. 
119 Id. 
120 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
121 Kirby, 496 U.S. at 689. 
122 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91. 
123 Id. at 485-86. 
124 Id. at 485.  ―One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: ‗Let them have the most il-
lustrious counsel, now.  They can‘t escape the noose.  There is nothing that counsel can do 
for them at trial.‘ ‖  Id. at 488 (quoting Ex Parte Sullivan, 107 F. Supp. 514, 517-18 (D.U.T. 
1952).  As the Court whimsically stated ―[w]e have learned the lesson of history, ancient and 
modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement[] which comes to depend on the ‗confes-
sion‘ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than any system which 
depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.‖  Id. at 
16
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the opportunity to consult with his lawyer and that the denied re-
quests for consultation of both the defendant and his attorney violated 
the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.125  The Court ex-
plained, ―only when the process shifts from investigatory to accusato-
ry – when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a con-
fession – our adversary system begins to operate, and . . . the accused 
must be permitted to consult with his lawyer.‖126 
The Supreme Court later reconciled Escobedo in Moran by 
claiming that the primary purpose of the Escobedo decision was not 
to vindicate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but rather to 
―guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-
incrimination[.]‖127  In Moran, previously discussed with respect to 
waiver of Miranda rights,128 the defendant argued, relying largely on 
Escobedo, that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been vi-
olated when police continued his interrogation, after, unbeknownst to 
him, counsel had been retained on his behalf.129  The defendant 
claimed that interrogation, much like formal proceedings, should 
trigger the attorney-client privilege since it represents a critical stage 
in adversarial proceedings, during which time ―police questioning of-
ten seal[s] a suspect‘s fate[.]130  The Court in Moran, however, dis-
missed the defendant‘s argument as both ―practically and theoretical-
ly unsound[,]‖ and aside from Escobedo, ruled consistent with 
precedent, that the Sixth Amendment protections do not attach until 
the initiation of judicial proceedings. 131 
 
488-89. 
125 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91. 
126 Id. at 492.  The Court discussed that history ―shows that confessions have often been 
extorted to save law enforcement officials the trouble and effort of obtaining valid and inde-
pendent evidence‖ to solidify a conviction.  Id. at 490.  History has also shown that the crim-
inal justice system cannot, nor should it, survive  ―if it comes to depend for its continued ef-
fectiveness on the citizens‘ abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.  Id.  
Where the effectiveness of a system is based on preventing an accused from consulting with 
an attorney in order to keep her from becoming fully aware of her constitutional rights, this 
is a system that is not worth preserving.  Id. 
127 Moran, 475 U.S. at 429. 
128 See supra notes 98-109. 
129 Moran, 475 U.S. at 428-30. 
130 Id. at 428-29, 431. 
131 Id. at 430. 
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V. WAIVER OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Similar to the requirements for a valid wavier of a suspect‘s 
Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a proper waiver of a suspect‘s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires an intentional relinquish-
ment and a full awareness of the nature and consequences of the 
waiver of that right.132 
[W]hen a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which 
include the right to have counsel present during inter-
rogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typi-
cally does the trick, even though the Miranda rights 
purportedly have their source in the Fifth Amendment: 
―As a general matter . . . an accused who is admo-
nished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in 
Miranda . . . has been sufficiently apprised of the na-
ture of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the conse-
quences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver 
on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelli-
gent one.‖133 
The Court in Patterson v. Illinois134 provided the inquiry as 
follows: ―[w]as the accused, who waived his Sixth Amendment rights 
during postindictment questioning, made sufficiently aware of his 
right to have counsel present during the questioning, and of the poss-
ible consequences of a decision to forego the aid of counsel?‖135  The 
Court in Patterson rejected the defendant‘s argument that ―the [S]ixth 
[A]mendment right [to counsel] is far superior to that of the [F]ifth 
[A]mendment right[,]‖ with which a greater potential for loss could 
result from a finding of valid waiver.136  As such, the defendant ar-
gued the Sixth Amendment is deserving of a more stringent standard 
to effectuate valid waiver than that of the Fifth Amendment.137  While 
 
132 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988).  A ―defendant may waive the right 
whether or not he is already represented by counsel; [and] the decision to waive need not 
itself be counseled.‖  Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009). 
133 Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786-87 (quoting Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296). 
134 487 U.S. 285 (1988). 
135 Id. at 292-93. 
136 Id. at 297. 
137 Id. 
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the Court has ―recognized a difference between the Fifth Amendment 
and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, and the policies behind these 
constitutional guarantees, [they] have never suggested that one right 
is superior or greater than the other.‖138  Further, the Court found no 
support for the defendant‘s argument ―that because a Sixth Amend-
ment right may be involved, it is more difficult to waive than the 
Fifth Amendment counterpart.‖139 
The Court in Patterson instead, applied a pragmatic approach 
to resolve the issue of waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel that considers ―the usefulness of counsel to the accused at the par-
ticular proceeding, and the dangers to the accused of proceeding 
without counsel.‖140  Under this pragmatic analysis, a knowing and 
voluntary waiver, as required to waive a Fifth Amendment right is al-
so sufficient to waive a Sixth Amendment right to counsel.141  The 
Court reasoned that postindictment questioning ―does not substantial-
ly increase the value of counsel to the accused at questioning or ex-
pand the limited purposes that an attorney serves when the accused is 
questioned by authorities.‖142 
 
VI. NEW YORK’S EXPANSION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL THROUGH REASONING REMINISCENT 
OF MIRANDA 
Miranda has been fully adopted by New York courts as it is 
consistent with article I § 6 of the New York Constitution.143  How-
 
138 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
139 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 297-98. 
140 Id. at 298. 
141 Id. at 300. 
142 Id. at 298-99. 
143 Paulman, 833 N.E.2d at 244.  Applicable parts of the New York State Constitution 
reads: ―No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself 
or herself . . . [n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.‖  N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.  Miranda ―protects the privilege against self-incrimination 
and ‗because the privilege applies only when an accused is ―compelled‖ to testify, the safe-
guards required by Miranda are not triggered unless a suspect is subject to ―custodial inter-
rogation.‖ ‘ ‖  Paulman, 833 N.E.2d at 243 (quoting People v. Berg, 708 N.E.2d 979, 981 
(N.Y. 1999)).  New York courts adopted the objective test, of ―whether a reasonable person 
innocent of any wrongdoing would have believed that he or she was not free to leave‖ to de-
termine an individual‘s custodial status.  Id.  New York further follows, under Miranda, that 
19
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ever, the New York Court of Appeals has ―recognized that the State 
Constitution may provide rights broader than those guaranteed under 
the Fifth Amendment.‖144  Specifically, with respect to the right to 
counsel, New York views this right ―as a cherished and valuable pro-
tection that must be guarded with the utmost vigilance.‖145  Accor-
dingly, the New York Court of Appeals ―construe[s] the right to 
counsel coupled with the privilege against self-incrimination and due 
process under the state constitution more liberally than the Supreme 
Court of the United States has interpreted parallel provisions of the 
federal constitution.‖146  New York‘s constitutional right to counsel 
not only extends well beyond that of the Sixth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, it also affords the most extensive protec-
tion against self-incrimination than any other jurisdiction in the coun-
try.147 
New York considers the right to counsel ―indelible[.]‖148  
Once the right attaches, a suspect may not be questioned unless the 
right is affirmatively waived in the presence of her attorney.149  Af-
 
the term ―interrogation‖ is not limited to refer strictly to express questioning, but also refers 
to ―any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to ar-
rest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response[.]‖  Id. at 244. 
144 Id.  New York recognizes broader rights than those protected under the Fifth Amend-
ment ―[i]n cases involving successive interrogations where a Mirandized statement was pre-
ceded by an improper, unwarned admission . . . .‖  Id. 
145 People v. Lopez, 947 N.E.2d 1155, 1158 (N.Y. 2011). 
146 N.Y. CRIM. PRACTICE 2-23 § 23.05.  ―[W]e live in a federal system where the States 
remain free, as a matter of policy or state constitutional law, to raise the floor of individual 
rights that the U.S. Constitution sets.‖  Brooks Holland, A Relational Sixth Amendment Dur-
ing Interrogation, 99 CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 381, 428 (2009) (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 
U.S. 714, 719 (1975)).  The United States Supreme Court‘s decisions interpreting the United 
States Constitution ―are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights 
guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law.‖  William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). 
147 N.Y. CRIM. PRACTICE 2-23 § 23.05.  See Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: 
Judicial Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 764 (1982) (dis-
cussing New York‘s expansive view on the right to counsel which ―constitute[s] the strong-
est protection of [the] right to counsel anywhere in the country‖). 
148 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 364.  See People v. Grice, 794 N.E.2d 9, 10 (N.Y. 2003) 
(noting that the ―indelible right to counsel arises from the provision of the State Constitution 
that guarantees due process of law, the right to effective assistance of counsel and the privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination‖). 
149 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 364.  Once this indelible right attaches, ―New York law 
protects the attorney-client relationship assiduously.‖  Holland, supra note 146, at 430. 
20
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fording ―an indelible right to counsel to an individual facing the 
prospect of police questioning once an attorney has entered the case 
serves the important function of ensuring that any waiver of the right 
is truly knowing and intelligent.‖150  This requirement further en-
sures, at the bare minimum, that the defendant has received the ad-
vice of counsel before making the determination to surrender her le-
gal rights.151 
Under the New York Constitution, the indelible right to coun-
sel can attach in two ways.152  First, similar to the federal interpreta-
tion of the Sixth Amendment, the right will automatically attach at 
the commencement of a criminal proceeding, namely when an accu-
satory instrument is filed against the defendant, regardless of whether 
an attorney has been retained or requested.153  This means of attach-
ment parallels the federal application of the Sixth Amendment, re-
cognizing that ―when formal judicial proceedings commence, ‗the 
character of the police function shifts from investigatory to accusato-
ry‘ and the assistance of counsel becomes ‗indispensable[.]‘ ‖154 
Under the second and more controversial means, ―[t]he right 
to counsel can also attach prior to the commencement of formal pro-
ceedings when a person in custody asks to speak to an attorney, or 
when an attorney enters the case to represent an uncharged individu-
al.‖155  Beginning with the landmark case of People v. Donovan,156 
New York‘s expansive interpretation of the right to counsel emerged 
in response to the growing need to protect criminal suspects from po-
lice abuse during pre-arraignment and pre-indictment questioning.157 
In Donovan, the police elicited a written confession from the 
accused after refusing to allow him to confer with the attorney re-
tained on his behalf and who was physically present at the police sta-
tion.158  In this pre-Miranda decision, the Court in Donovan, ―looking 
to the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to due 
 
150 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 366. 
151 N.Y. CRIM. PRACTICE 2-23 § 23.05. 
152 Lopez, 947 N.E.2d at 1158. 
153 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 364. 
154 People v. Claudio, 447 N.Y.S.2d 972, 978 (App. Div. 2d Dep‘t 1982). 
155 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 364. 
156 193 N.E.2d 628 (N.Y. 2003). 
157 Claudio, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 979. 
158 Donovan, 193 N.E.2d at 629. 
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process, held that a person in custody and represented by an attorney 
cannot waive his rights outside the presence of his attorney, despite 
the fact that no judicial proceedings had taken place.‖159  The Court 
in Donovan further condemned the continued interrogation of the ac-
cused as contravening ―the basic dictates of fairness in the conduct of 
criminal causes and the fundamental rights of persons charged with 
crime.‖160 
Therefore, New York follows the rule that once the police 
have actual or constructive knowledge that either ―the defendant is 
represented by counsel or that an attorney has communicated with the 
police for the purpose of representing the defendant the accused‘s 
right to counsel attaches[.]‖161  There is no requirement that an attor-
ney who contacts the police department to give notice of her repre-
sentation speak with an actual police officer, even a civilian phone 
operator is sufficient to put the police on notice of the attorney‘s re-
presentation.162  However, absent such communication, as seen in in-
stances where third party individuals, family, friend, or otherwise, in-
form an officer of an attorney‘s involvement, there is no obligation 
on the part of the questioning officer to discontinue, or refrain from 
conducting an interrogation.163 
Further, the status of attorney representation is not based on 
who retained the representation, as an attorney can be retained by the 
 
159 Claudio, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 979. 
160 Donovan, 193 N.E.2d at 630. 
―The predicates for [the second] branch of the counsel rule,‖ the Court of 
Appeals emphasized in . . . language strikingly reminiscent of Miranda 
―are fundamental fairness, the belief that an attorney‘s presence is the 
most effective means of minimizing the disadvantage of the accused per-
son in custody, and the recognition that an unrepresented defendant in 
custody, who has requested an attorney has indicated his own belief that 
without legal advice he is not competent to deal with those in whose cus-
tody he is being held.‖ 
Robert O., 439 N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (quoting People v. Kazmarick, 420 N.E.2d 45, 48 (N.Y. 
1981)). 
161 People v. Arthur, 239 N.E.2d 537, 539 (N.Y. 1968).  For New York‘s indelible right to 
attach, an attorney can enter the case ―by actually appearing or directly communicating with 
the police by telephone.‖  Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 364.  Direct communication can also 
be made by a professional associate of the attorney speaking on the attorney‘s behalf.  Grice, 
794 N.E.2d at 13. 
162 People v. Pinzon, 377 N.E.2d 721, 724-25 (N.Y. 1978). 
163 Grice, 794 N.E.2d at 13. 
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suspect herself or by the suspect‘s family.164  It is a common practice 
for family members to retain counsel on behalf of the accused, and 
absent an unequivocal rejection of the representation, the court im-
pliedly assumes the existence of an attorney-client relationship.165  In 
addition, the attachment of the right to counsel does not require the 
defendant to sign a formal retainer with her attorney, such a require-
ment has been held to be nothing more than arbitrary and mechani-
cal.166 
Regardless of whether the individual is in police custody, 
once there is marked attorney involvement in a case on behalf of the 
suspect, all police questioning on that matter must cease.167  The ces-
sation of questioning should be automatic and does not require the 
suspect‘s attorney to explicitly request that the police discontinue the 
questioning of her client.168  New York has expanded the right to 
counsel so far that even where an accused is represented by an attor-
ney on an unrelated matter, as seen in People v. Rogers169 the court 
has held, the police may not question the accused or attempt to elicit 
statements beyond what is required for processing.170 
New York‘s expansive interpretation of the right to counsel 
was illustrated in Borukhova.  Despite finding that the defendant‘s 
statements were not obtained in violation of her Miranda rights since 
she was not formally subjected to custodial interrogation, and thereby 
never triggered the police‘s obligation to Mirandize, the Appellate 
Division found that the statements obtained at the police precinct 
were in violation of her right to counsel.171  The defendant‘s sister 
contacted an attorney on the defendant‘s behalf, and despite not sign-
ing a formal retainer, once the attorney contacted the police precinct 
and advised the telephone operator of his representation, under New 
York law, the right to counsel attached.172  Accordingly, the court 
held that even though the defendant stated that she did not know the 
 
164 Borukhova, 931 N.Y.S.2d at 364. 
165 Id. at 366. 
166 Grice, 794 N.E.2d at 11. 
167 Lopez, 947 N.E.2d at 1158. 
168 People v. Garofolo, 389 N.E.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 1979). 
169 397 N.E.2d 709 (N.Y. 1979). 
170 Id. at 713. 
171 See supra notes 48-55. 
172 See supra note 54. 
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attorney nor personally retain him, any waiver of her indelible right 
to counsel, subsequent to the attorney entering the case, must be 
made in the presence of such counsel.173 
 
VII. PEOPLE V. BORUKHOVA THROUGH THE SCOPE OF NEW 
YORK’S EXPANSIVE VIEW OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AS 
COMPARED TO THE FEDERAL COURT’S NARROW VIEW 
WHICH SERVES TO UNDERMINE THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE 
The right to the presence of counsel during interrogation is 
rooted in the constitutional protections found in the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.174  However, the right to counsel found in the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments protect a criminal defendant ―at separate stages of 
the criminal process.‖175  The Fifth Amendment protections apply at 
any stage of a criminal proceeding, whether pre-or-post indictment, 
where the individual is subjected to custodial interrogation, and are 
intended to protect against the inherently compulsory and coercive 
nature of those interrogations.176  Whereas the Sixth Amendment pro-
tections only apply after an individual has been formally charged, and 
is intended to protect ―an accused‘s right to have legal representation 
when the government communicates with her.‖177 
The Court has recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel automatically attaches at the initiation of a criminal proceed-
ing against an accused to ensure a fair trial, including at the ―critical‖ 
pretrial stages.178  This extension of the right to pre-trial stages focus-
es on the fact that ―the accused is confronted, just as at trial, by his 
expert adversary in a situation where the results of the confrontation 
may settle the accused‘s fate and reduce the trial to a mere formali-
 
173 See supra notes 33, 54-55. 
174 Daniel C. Nester, Distinguishing Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights to Counsel During 
Police Questioning, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 101, 102 (1991).  Both the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments are applicable to state proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at n.15, 
16. 
175 Id. at 102. 
176 Id. at 102-03. 
177 Id.  ―The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, therefore, preserves an accused‘s choice 
to communicate with police only through counsel.‖  Nester, supra note 174, at 103-04. 
178 Id. at 102-03, 108. 
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ty.‖179  In Escobedo, although the Court essentially took an ad hoc 
approach in deciding this case, the majority recognized that ―most 
confessions are obtained during the period between arrest and in-
dictment‖ and therefore ―this period points up its critical nature as a 
‗stage when legal aid and advice‘ are surely needed.180  Despite this 
revelation, the Court maintains that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not attach absent overtly accusatorial pre-trial stages, 
namely the filing of a formal criminal charge.181 
As such, under the federal interpretation of the right to coun-
sel, an individual who is not clearly subject to custodial interrogation, 
nor faced with a formal criminal charge, may be left without protec-
tion during police questioning.  In Borukhova, consistent with both 
New York State and federal laws, the court found the defendant was 
not subject to custodial interrogation and thus, her Fifth Amendment 
rights were not triggered.182  However, unlike New York law, if Bo-
rukhova was decided under federal law, the court would likely find 
that the defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not trig-
gered either.  As such, under federal law, even though counsel was 
obtained on the defendant‘s behalf prior to interrogation, assumedly 
because the defendant‘s sister saw a need for representation, the de-
fendant would have likely been left without any constitutional protec-
tions against self-incrimination.  This fact is especially unsettling be-
cause even though the defendant‘s questioning did not formally 
constitute custodial interrogation, one could infer from the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the questioning that at the precinct, the 
police questioning transformed from investigatory to accusatory. 
As Justice Marshall has personally recognized, ―in certain sit-
uations an individual‘s right to counsel is triggered before the formal 
 
179 Id. at 108.  Where the Sixth Amendment traditionally only applied to the trial stages of 
a proceeding in order to protect an accused‘s procedural rights, the Court extended the appli-
cation to pretrial stages to protect an accused‘s substantive rights.  Id.  
180 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488 (quoting Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 
(1964)).  As the Court whimsically stated in Escobedo, ―[w]e have learned the lesson of his-
tory, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement[] which comes to de-
pend on the ‗confession‘ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses 
than any system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful 
investigation.‖  Id. at 488-89. 
181 Nester, supra note 174, at 109. 
182 See supra notes 49-50. 
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initiation of adversary judicial proceedings.‖183  He continued, ―[t]his 
recognition has stemmed from an appreciation that the government 
can transform an individual into an ‗accused‘ without officially de-
signating him as such through the ritual of arraignment.‖184  To pro-
tect the defendant from potentially harmful questioning, consistent 
with Escobedo, an attorney-client relationship should trigger a defen-
dant‘s Sixth Amendment right to counsel to protect the defendant 
from self-incrimination.185 
While the purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
not to ―wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-client relation-
ship‖ the government disregarding an existing attorney-client rela-
tionship would undermine the sanctity of the relationship itself.186  
The Court has recognized that ―[o]nce an accused has a lawyer, a dis-
tinct set of constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity 
of the attorney-client relationship takes effect,‖187 and yet, the federal 
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, in effect 
somewhat ironically ―undermine[s] the practical import of the right to 
counsel in the interrogation context by undervaluing the attorney-
relationship itself.‖188  If the State is allowed to interrogate an ac-
cused without counsel, ―there is no denying the fact that [this] largely 
negates the benefits of the constitutional guaranty of the right to as-
sistance of counsel.‖189 
The Sixth Amendment protections are intended to ensure a 
criminal defendant receives a fair trial, and yet more than ninety per-
 
183 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 199 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
184 Id. 
185 Our system is accusatorial, not inquisitorial in nature.  Moran, 475 U.S. at 434 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).  Under this system, the burden is on society to prove ―its charge against 
the accused not out of his own mouth.  It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the 
accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently secured through skill-
ful investigation.‖  Id. at n.1.  Further, ―protracted, systematic and uncontrolled subjection of 
an accused to interrogation by the police for the purpose of eliciting disclosure or confession 
is subversive of the accusatorial system.‖  Id.  See also Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-89 (stat-
ing that a system ―which comes to depend on the ‗confession‘ will, in the long run, be less 
reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence inde-
pendently secured through skillful investigation.‖) 
186 See supra note 119. 
187 Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 181 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
188 Holland, supra note 146, at 381. 
189 Moran, 475 U.S. at 436 n.5. 
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cent of criminal cases are resolved without ever being tried.190  Be-
cause criminal defendants ―rarely face their accusers during tradition-
al courtroom proceedings that pit skilled trial lawyers against each 
other[,]‖ most clients‘ fates are determined through their defense at-
torneys ―telephone calls, meetings, and investigations, and by advis-
ing a client effectively on how properly to limit the scope or strength 
of a prosecution[.]‖191  The defendant‘s obvious goal in mind is ―to 
achieve the best disposition possible.‖192  ―Perhaps in no pretrial con-
text can th[e] advise of counsel matter more than during an interroga-
tion, where cases and deals often can be won or lost.‖193  To deny an 
individual the right to the presence of an attorney during interrogation 
could in effect ―make the trial no more than an appeal from the inter-
rogation; and the right to use counsel at the formal trial [] a very hol-
low thing.‖194  Still, ―the [United States] Supreme Court‘s current 
right to counsel jurisprudence profoundly minimizes the importance 
of the attorney-client relationship during [] pretrial interrogation.‖195 
Further, because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not 
self-actuating, once triggered, even by way of a formal charge, it can 
be waived without the presence of counsel.196  As such, by ―impro-
perly gaug[ing] Sixth Amendment problems by a counter-textual 
freewill theory of client decision–making imported from Fifth 
Amendment Miranda jurisprudence[,]‖ it is clear the Court underva-
lues the defense attorney‘s role during interrogations.197  ―Further, the 
Supreme Court largely gutted the notion that counsel‘s constitutional 
value to a client extends beyond the four corners of the charging in-
strument when the Court declared that the right to counsel is offense 
specific, with offense defined narrowly[.]‖198  This interpretation has 
the practical effect of allowing for law enforcement to work around 
any pre-existing attorney-client relationship so they can ―question a 
charged defendant about nearly anything, up to and including the 
 
190 Holland, supra note 146, at 381-82. 
191 Id. at 382. 
192 Id.  
193 Id. at 384. 
194 Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 487. 
195 Holland, supra note 146, at 384. 
196 Id. at 385. 
197 Id. at 386. 
198 Id. at 385. 
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precise factual subject of filed charges.‖199  Yet, despite all of this, 
with the one exception of Escobedo, the Supreme Court has consis-
tently read that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not triggered 
prior to the initiation of formal criminal proceedings even by an ex-
isting attorney-client relationship.200 
On the other hand, New York‘s expansive interpretation of 
the right to counsel provides vital safeguards to protect a criminal de-
fendant or accused from self-incrimination.  New York, based on 
principles that closely mirror the fundamental considerations for the 
adoption of Miranda rights, recognizes the need for additional protec-
tions even prior to the commencement of formal proceedings.201  The 
New York interpretation of the right to counsel protections recogniz-
es that statements elicited by police, even prior to a formal arraign-
ment or indictment, could seal a defendant‘s fate and essentially 
render the federal court‘s application of the right to counsel protec-
tions useless.202  In the case of Borukhova, the Appellate Division 
upheld the defendant‘s conviction, finding that her statements made 
at the police precinct should have been suppressed, but nevertheless 
constituted harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence 
against her.203  But that is not to say that had the evidentiary factors 
of Borukhova been different, the statements the defendant made to 
the police could have alone been enough to seal her fate. 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The federal interpretation of the right to counsel leaves a 
criminal defendant without protections against self-incrimination at 
vital pre-trial stages of a prosecution.  Prior to the formal com-
mencement of judicial proceedings, the government may be able to 
evade an individual‘s constitutional rights, and elicit self-
incriminating statements that turn the actual trial into nothing more 
than a formality.  New York‘s application of the right to counsel, as 
 
199 Id.  
200 See supra notes 115-16. 
201 See supra notes 154-59. 
202 See supra notes154-56, 177-79. 
203 See supra notes 53-56. 
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an indelible right of the highest importance, better represents the 
needs of a criminal defendant for protection against the system.  An 
individual‘s right against self-incrimination, would be best served if 
all courts followed New York‘s approach and extended an indelible 
right to counsel to all accused, even if prior to the formal com-
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